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Objective: To study the role of human factors on surgical outcomes, with a
series of 243 arterial switch operations performed by 21 surgeons taken as a
model. 
Methods: The following data were collected: patient-specific and procedural
variables, self-assessment questionnaires, and a written report from a human
factors researcher who observed the operation. The relationship of patient-
specific variables to outcomes (death and death and/or near miss) was used
to develop a multivariable baseline model to analyze the role of human fac-
tors after adjustment for these variables. 
Results: The overall mortality was 6.6% with 24.3% of cases resulting in
death and death and/or near misses. The self-assessment questionnaires were
found to be unhelpful. Major and minor human failures were extracted from
the written report. Major negative events were potentially life-threatening
failures, whereas minor events were failures that, in isolation, were not
expected to have serious consequences. Major events were closely related to
death (P < .001) and death and/or near misses (P < .001). Appropriate com-
pensation, however, sharply reduced the risk of death (P = .003). The total
number of minor events was also closely related to both death and death
and/or near misses (P < .001). 
Conclusion: The study highlights the role of human factors in negative surgi-
cal outcomes. Even in the most eventful circumstances, however, appropri-
ate human factors defense mechanisms can lead to a successful outcome.
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C ardiac surgery shares many properties with hightechnology systems in which performance and out-
comes depend on complex individual, technical, and
organizational factors and their interactions. In those
systems, often referred to as complex sociotechnical
systems, human factors research of the past 2 decades
has been a major contributor to safety and reliability
enhancement. The present study is an attempt to apply
similar research to cardiac surgery with the expectation
that this should help physicians to understand adverse
events and establish ways to prevent them. The neona-
tal arterial switch operation (ASO) for transposition of
the great arteries (TGA) was taken as a model of high
technology surgery. It is a procedure with low error tol-
erance, requiring a sophisticated organizational struc-
ture, the coordinated efforts of multiple persons work-
ing as a team, and high levels of cognitive and technical
performance. The homogeneity of the patient popula-
tion and the standardization of the overall management,
including the surgical procedures, facilitates the inves-
tigation of human factors against a uniform clinical
background. To explore the role of situational, organi-
zational, institutional, and individual differences, the
study has included multiple surgical teams and institu-
tions. 
Methods
Patients and procedures. A total of 243 neonatal (<35
days) ASOs for TGA and TGA plus ventricular septal defect
(TGA+VSD) performed by all 21 cardiac surgeons in the
United Kingdom in 16 institutions during an 18-month peri-
od (January 1996–June 1997) were entered into the study. A
questionnaire on perioperative patient-specific and procedur-
al variables was completed immediately after the operation
by the surgeon, the anesthetist, and the perfusionist.
Appendix A shows all the patient and procedural variables
that were included in the study.
Human factors data. Three sets of human factors data
were collected. 
The Surgical Team Assessment Record (STAR). Self-assess-
ment questionnaires investigating a range of organizational,
team, situational, and personal factors were filled in at the
completion of the operation by the surgeon, the first and sec-
ond assistant, the anesthetist, the perfusionist, and the scrub
nurse (Appendix B). 
Case reports. The ASOs were observed by a human factors
researcher who attended the operation from the induction of
anesthesia to admission to the intensive care unit. A detailed
description of the operation was written down as the proce-
dure was taking place. This included information on individ-
ual and team performance, communication within each team
and between different teams, as well as situational and orga-
nizational data. In addition, errors or failures that occurred
during the procedure were carefully recorded and categorized
as minor or major negative events. Minor events were failures
that disrupted the “surgical flow” of the procedure but which,
in isolation, were not expected to have serious consequences
for the safety of the patient. Major events were failures that
were likely to have serious consequences for the safety of the
patient. Major and minor events were judged by the human
factors researcher to be either “compensated for” or “uncom-
pensated.” An event was deemed to have been “compensated
for” when the patient recovered or when the consequences of
the event were negated by appropriate action. 
Because some ASOs took place simultaneously in several
institutions, 50 operations were not attended by a human fac-
tors researcher. Therefore 193 reports were available for
analysis. They were reviewed at the completion of the study
by 2 human factors experts (J.C. and J.T.R.) and by a surgeon
(M.dL.). As expected, the accuracy and the depth of these
reports increased with experience. So that the consistency
and reliability of the data could be ensured, 10 cases consid-
ered to be part of this learning curve were discarded from the
analysis (5 cases each for 2 human factors researchers).
Furthermore, 1 of the 3 human factors observers who attend-
ed 10 ASOs never gained sufficient knowledge of the proce-
dure to make informed judgments about problems experi-
enced during the cases. His reports were also rejected in the
final analysis. In all, 173 reports were thought to be suffi-
ciently reliable.
Volume of cases. The number of ASOs performed during
the course of this study was looked at as a human factor.
Surgeons were divided into low (<15 cases) or high (≥15
cases) volumes. Six surgeons were accordingly classified as
high-volume surgeons and 14 surgeons were classified as
low-volume surgeons.
Outcome events. Clinical outcomes (OC) were divided
into 4 categories:
• OC1: Extubated and well within 72 hours of the surgical pro-
cedure, with no intraoperative or postoperative complications.
• OC2: Prolonged intubation (ie, >72 hours) and/or revers-
ible morbidity; minor infections, paralyzed diaphragm,
pneumothorax, pleural effusion, renal failure necessitating
nonroutine peritoneal dialysis, minor temporary neurologic
complications. 
• OC3: Survival with near misses. Near misses included
ischemia evidenced on the electrocardiogram and/or
hemodynamic problems such as low systemic blood pres-
sure and rising left atrial pressure at the end of the opera-
tion, necessitating the reinstitution of cardiopulmonary
bypass, support with an extracorporeal membrane oxy-
genator for poor cardiac performance, profound postoper-
ative low cardiac output, postoperative cardiac arrest,
deep-seated infection (mediastinitis and septicemia), and
permanent neurologic damage.
• OC4: Hospital death.
All records had a code number unknown to those who ana-
lyzed the data to maintain anonymity and to protect confi-
dentiality.
Statistical analysis. The primary analyses were based on
logistic regression analyses of 2 binary outcomes. The first
modeled the probability of death and the second modeled the
probability of death and/or near miss. The results of the logistic
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regression analyses were summarized in terms of odds ratios.
For a continuous variable such as a time measurement, the odds
ratio compared the odds of death for 2 individuals whose time
measurements differ by 1 unit, typically 1 minute in this study.
If individuals’ times differed by k minutes, then their odds of
death would be related by a factor of (odds ratio)k. For example,
if for bypass time an odds ratio was estimated as 1.02 for a dif-
ference of 1 minute, the odds ratio comparing 2 patients whose
bypass times differed by 60 minutes would be 3.28.
Patient characteristics and procedural variables were first
submitted to a univariate analysis. Patient-specific variables
were then combined to develop a multivariable baseline
model for death and a similar one for death and/or near miss
so as to study the human factors variables after adjustment for
patient characteristics. 
Because of their close correlation with clinical outcomes,
anesthetic time (induction of anesthesia and insertion of lines),
crossclamping time, and bypass time were used to define “sur-
rogate outcomes.” These surrogate outcomes were defined as
the linear combination of the intraoperative timings best relat-
ed to the probability of negative outcomes after adjustment for
patient-specific variables (coronary artery pattern [CAP], VSD,
and sex). An indicator of a missing length of anesthesia time
was also included to avoid significant data loss.
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Fig 1. Distribution of ASOs per surgeon.
Fig 2. Frequency of deaths and near misses per surgeon.
Results 
Clinical outcomes. The numbers of cases per sur-
geon with the frequency of death and near misses are
shown in Figs 1 and 2. There were 16 hospital deaths,
an overall mortality of 6.6%, with 43 near misses
(17.7%). Thus death and/or near misses occurred in
24.3% of the cases. A total of 119 cases (49%) were
OC1 and 65 (27%) were OC2. 
Logistic regression analysis. The CAP was the
patient-specific risk factor most strongly related to both
death and death and/or near misses. The CAP was
divided into 6 categories. Table I summarizes their fre-
quency and the outcomes for each type.
The results of the single-factor logistic regression
analyses of the patient and procedural variables are
summarized in Tables II and III with death or death
and/or near misses used as the outcome variables. They
include only those patient and procedural variables that
demonstrated some statistical significance in the uni-
variate analysis. The other patient characteristics that
demonstrated some relationship to negative outcomes
other than CAP were balloon atrial septostomy (P =
.040), the presence of a VSD (P = .020), and sex (P =
.07). The third characteristic was associated with an
increased risk of death but not death and/or near miss.
TGA+VSD cases were estimated to have an odds of
negative outcome 1.5 times (95% confidence interval
[CI] 0.80, 2.9) that of simple TGA cases in the death
and/or near miss analysis (Table III). 
Procedural factors associated with an increased risk
of negative outcomes included duration of anesthesia
(P = .01) in the death analysis, bypass time (P < .001),
crossclamping time (P < .001), and circulatory arrest
time (P = .003) in the death and/or near miss analysis.
Stenting of the sternum and the use of epinephrine and
isoproterenol (INN: isoprenaline), which were also
related to a high incidence of negative events, were not
used in further analyses because they generally reflect-
ed intraoperative problems. 
On the basis of the results of the univariate analy-
sis and good background knowledge, a multivariable
baseline logistic regression model, including CAP,
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Table I. CAPs and outcomes
Deaths and 
Type Description of CAP No. of cases (%) Deaths (%) near misses (%)
CAP 1 LAD Cx from sinus 1, RCA from sinus 2 157 (63%) 6 (4%) 25 (16%)
CAP 2 LAD from sinus 1, RCA Cx from sinus 2 34 (14%) 0 10 (29%)
CAP 3 Single coronary from either sinus 1 or 2 13 (6%) 2 (15%) 5 (39%)
CAP 4 RCA from sinus 1 14 (6%) 3 (21%) 5 (36%)
CAP 5 Juxtacommissural origin of both coronaries (posterior) and 9 (4%) 1 (11%) 3 (33%)
exceptional patterns
CAP 6 Intramural CAP (including both intramural RCA and LCA) 16 (7%) 4 (25%) 11 (69%)
CAP, Coronary arterial pattern; LAD, left anterior descending coronary artery; Cx, circumflex coronary artery; RCA, right coronary artery; LCA, left coronary artery.
Table II. Results of univariate logistic regression analyses of patient and procedural factors in which “death” was
the outcome variable
Variable Coefficient P value OR 95% CI for OR
Sex (female vs male) 0.90 .070 2.6 (0.92, 7.08)
CAP 2 vs CAP 1 * * * *
CAP 3 vs CAP 1 1.5 .08 4.6 (0.82, 25)
CAP 4, 5, and 6 vs CAP 1 1.9 .0010 6.5 (2.1, 20)
TGA+VSD vs simple TGA 0.38 .50 1.5 (0.48, 4.38)
BAS (no vs yes) 0.14 .86 0.87 (0.19, 4.0)
Duration of anesthesia (min) 0.030 .010 1.03 (1.01, 1.05)
Length of time on bypass (min) 0.020 <.0010 1.02 (1.01, 1.03)
Duration of total circulatory arrest (min) 0.020 .33 1.02 (0.98, 1.07)
Crossclamping time (min) 0.030 .0010 1.03 (1.01, 1.05)
Epinephrine (no vs yes) –1.65 .0020 0.19 (0.070, 0.56)
Isoproterenol (no vs yes) –1.55 .020 0.21 (0.060, 0.74)
Sternum closed (no vs yes) 1.58 .0080 4.9 (1.5, 15.8)
OR, Odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; CAP, Coronary arterial pattern; TGA, transposition of the great arteries; VSD, ventricular septal defect; BAS, balloon atrial
septostomy.
*Not estimable (no deaths in CAP 2).
sex, and an indicator for VSD cases, was then gener-
ated (Table IV). Separate models were estimated for
death and death and/or near miss. The following
points about these models are noteworthy: First, there
was no evidence that the balloon atrial septostomy
variable added anything to either model; second,
there were no deaths among patients with CAP 2, so
these cases were grouped with CAPs 4, 5, and 6 for
death and with CAP 1 in another analysis. There was
no difference in the results for either grouping of
CAP 2. No formal significance level was used in the
choice of these models. They are simply used to pro-
vide comparable adjustments for CAP, VSD, and sex
in subsequent analyses of negative outcomes.
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Table III. Results of univariate logistic regression analyses of patient and procedural factors with “death and/or
near miss” used as the outcome variable
Variable Coefficient P value OR 95% CI for OR
Sex (female vs male) –0.052 .88 0.95 (0.50, 1.8)
CAP 2 vs CAP 1 0.79 .070 2.2 (0.94, 5.2)
CAP 3 vs CAP 1 1.2 .050 3.3 (1.0, 10.9)
CAP 4, 5 and 6 vs CAP 1 1.6 <.0010 5.0 (2.35, 11)
TGA+VSD vs simple TGA 0.43 .020 1.5 (0.80, 2.9)
BAS (no vs yes) 0.88 .040 0.42 (0.18, 0.96)
Duration of anesthesia (min) 0.010 .030 1.01 (1.00, 1.03)
Length of time on bypass (min) 0.020 <.0010 1.02 (1.01, 1.03)
Duration of total circulatory arrest (min) 0.040 .0030 1.04 (1.01, 1.07)
Crossclamping time (min) 0.040 <.0010 1.04 (1.02, 1.05)
Epinephrine (no vs yes) -1.58 <.0010 0.21 (0.11, 0.39)
Isoproterenol (no vs yes) -0.90 .070 0.41 (0.16, 1.07)
Sternum closed (no vs yes) 1.1 <.0010 3.0 (1.64, 5.51)
OR, Odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; CAP, coronary arterial pattern; TGA, transposition of the great arteries; VSD, ventricular septal defect; BAS, balloon atri-
al septostomy.
Table IV. Baseline logistic regression models 
Variable Coefficient P value OR 95% CI for OR
Baseline logistic regression model with 
death used as the response variable
Sex (female vs male) 0.94 .080 2.6 (0.91, 7.3)
CAP 3 vs CAP 1 1.5 .010 4.4 (0.77, 25)
CAPs 2, 4, 5, and 6 vs 1 1.1 .050 3.0 (1.0, 9.1)
TGA+VSD vs simple TGA 0.36 .54 1.4 (0.46, 4.4)
Baseline logistic regression model with 
death and/or near miss used as the 
response variable
Sex (female vs male) –0.1 .78 0.91 (0.46, 1.8)
CAP 2 vs CAP 1 0.77 .080 2.2 (0.91, 5.1)
CAP 3 vs CAP 1 1.1 .070 3.1 (0.93, 10.4)
CAP 4, 5, and 6 vs CAP 1 1.6 <.0010 5.2 (2.4, 11)
TGA+VSD vs simple TGA 0.44 .21 1.6 (0.78, 3.1)
OR, Odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; CAP, coronary arterial pattern; TGA, transposition of the great arteries; VSD, ventricular septal defect.
Table V. Multivariable analysis of timings variables
Death Death and/or near miss
Factor Coefficient P value Coefficient P value
Anesthesia 0.037 .0030 0.014 .070
Bypass 0.040 <.0010 0.021 .0010
Crossclamping –0.048 .026 0.0030 .82
The linear combinations of timings used to define the
surrogate outcomes are defined by the coefficients in
Table V.
Human factors data 
Surgical Team Assessment Records (STAR). None of
the variables from the STAR form was significant at the
1% level on clinical outcomes when added to the base-
line multiple regression model. The 1% level was used
to make an adjustment for multiple comparisons.
Adding the STAR variables to the regression models
for surrogate outcomes of death or death and/or near
miss, using a semiparametric analysis, also showed no
significance at the 1% level.
Surgical volume. The inclusion of the variable high-
volume (≥15 cases) versus low-volume (<15 cases) sur-
geons did not add significantly to the baseline model
for death (P = .376) or death and/or near miss (P =
.265). The odds of death for cases of a high-volume
surgeon were estimated to be 0.62 (95% CI: 0.22, 1.78)
times that for cases of a low-volume surgeon. The odds
ratio for death and/or near miss was estimated to be
0.70 (95% CI: 0.38, 1.31). The addition of volume to
the model of surrogate outcomes demonstrates a strong
relationship with the classification of surgeons as high
or low volume (P = .001). It must be noted, however,
that less than 5% of the variation in the timings variable
can be explained by the volume of surgery variable. 
Minor and major events. The lists of minor and major
events are shown in Appendix C. Tables VI and VII
show the frequency of major and minor negative events
per case and also the frequency of major and minor
uncompensated negative events per case. The number
of cases that had negative outcomes (ie, death and/or
near miss) is shown in parentheses. For example, 38
cases had 1 major event. In 33 cases the event was com-
pensated for, whereas in 5 cases the major event was
left uncompensated. Table VIII summarizes the results
of adding information on major and minor events sep-
arately to the baseline models. For each type of event,
4 analyses are recorded. The first looks only at the total
number of major or minor events (per case) for both the
death and death and/or near miss outcomes. The second
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Table VI. Number of major events per case
No. of major uncompensated events (No. cases with death, death and/or near miss)
0 1 2 3 4 5 Total
No. of major events
0 95 (–, 2) – – – – – 95 (–, 2)
1 33 (–, 4) 5 (–, 2) – – – – 38 (–, 6)
2 5 (–, 2) 6 (–, 5) 5 (3, 5) – – – 16 (3, 12)
3 1 (–, 1) 2 (–, 2) 4 (2, 4) 3 (3, 3) – – 10 (5, 10)
4 0 0 2 (1, 2) 0 (–, –) 1 (1, 1) – 3 (2, 3)
5 1 (–, 1) 0 0 3 (1, 3) 2 (2, 2) 1 (1, 1) 7 (4, 7)
6 0 1 (–, 1) 1 (–, 1) 0 0 2 (1, 2) 4 (1, 4)
Total 135 (0, 10) 14 (0, 10) 12 (6, 12) 6 (4, 6) 3 (3, 3) 3 (2, 3) 173 (15, 44)
Table VII. Number of minor events per case
No. of minor uncompensated events (No. cases with death, death and/or near miss
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8-10 11-14 15-20 Total
No. of 
minor events
0 3 – – – – – – – – – – 3
1 8 4 – – – – – – – – – 12 
2 1 3 13 (–, 2) – – – – – – – – 17 (0, 2)
3 0 1 10 (–, 1) 5 – – – – – – – 16 (0, 1)
4 1 2 5 (–, 1) 7 6 (–, 1) – – – – – – 21 (0, 2)
5 0 1 2 5 9 8 (–, 1) – – – – – 25 (0, 1)
6 0 1 0 0 6 (1, 2) 8 (–, 1) 4 (–, 1) – – – – 19 (1, 4)
7 0 0 0 0 1 6 (–, 1) 1 (–, 1) 4 (0, 1) – – – 12 (0, 3)
8-10 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 (–, 1) 7 (0, 1) 9 (4, 6) – – 21 (4, 8)
11-14 0 0 0 1 1 (–, 1) 0 0 0 6 (1, 5) 11 (5, 9) – 19 (6, 15)
15-20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 (2, 3) 5 (2, 5) 8 (4, 8)
Total 13 12 31 (0, 4) 18 23 (1, 4) 23 (0, 3) 8 (0, 3) 11 (0, 2) 15 (5, 11) 14 (7, 12) 5 (2, 5) 173 (15, 44)
analysis adds the number of major uncompensated
events per case to the first model. The third and fourth
analyses are the analogous models for the number of
minor negative events per case and the number of
uncompensated minor negative events. 
Table VIII shows that the number of major and minor
negative events per case has a strong relationship to
both outcomes (ie, death and death and/or near miss).
The number of uncompensated major events per case
has a major predictive relationship with death (after
adjustment for the number of major events per case) (P
= .003). For deaths and/or near misses, the number of
major events remains the dominant predictor (P <
.001), although there is some evidence for an addition-
al risk associated with the lack of compensation (P =
.026). The number of uncompensated minor events per
case adds little to the information provided by the num-
ber of minor events. Hence, whether or not human
compensation occurs for a minor event is not the key
factor; rather, it is the overall number of minor events
per case that is important (P < .001). 
Table IX presents the results of adding both the num-
ber of major events per case, the number of uncompen-
sated major events per case, and the number of minor
events per case jointly to the baseline models. The
same general patterns found in the separate analyses
are seen. The important distinction is that this table
provides, after adjusting for the effects of major and
major uncompensated events per case, suggestive evi-
dence of a link between the number of minor events per
case and death (P = .03), as well as strong evidence of
a link between the number of minor events per case and
death and/or near miss (P = .001). 
There was therefore no evidence that a compensated
major event influenced the odds of death, whereas the
odds of a death and/or near miss were increased by a
factor of 6.2 by such an event (see Table IX). For each
uncompensated major event, the estimated odds of
death are increased by a factor of 13 × 0.44 = 5.7 and
the estimated odds of a death and/or near miss are
increased by a factor of 40. The risk associated with the
occurrence of a minor event is less (1.4 and 1.4) per
event, but minor events have a multiplicative effect.
Discussion
The prolific human factors research in complex
sociotechnical systems of the past 2 decades has creat-
ed a spirit of glasnost within the medical profession
concerning the role played by human factors in the cau-
sation of medical accidents.1 This has been particularly
apparent in high technology fields such as operating
rooms2-4 or intensive care units.5 At the same time,
there is an increasing awareness that models and algo-
rithms for risk adjustment based on patient-related and
procedural variables investigate only a portion of fac-
tors determining outcomes.6
The present study is an attempt to carry out a com-
prehensive and prospective analysis of human factors
together with those variables classically included in
outcome analysis. It opens the field for novel research
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Table VIII. Major and minor events examined separately
Death Death and/or near miss
Type of analysis OR (95% CI) P value OR (95% CI) P value
1. No. of major events per case 2.4 (1.7, 3.5) <.0010 15 (6.0, 36) <.0010
2. No. of major events per case + 0.43 (0.12, 1.5) .19 7.5 (2.7, 21) <.0010
No. of uncompensated major events per case 23 (3.4, 154) .0030 5.3 (1.2, 23) .026
3. No. of minor events per case 1.5 (1.3, 1.8) <.0010 1.6 (1.4, 1.9) <.0010
4. No. of minor events per case + 1.1 (0.54, 2.1) .87 1.2 (0.81, 1.8) .37
No. of uncompensated minor events per case 1.5 (0.7, 3.1) .28 1.4 (0.90, 2.1) .14
OR, Odds ratio; CI, confidence intervals.
Table IX. Major and minor events examined jointly
Death Death and/or near miss
Type of analysis OR (95% CI) P value OR (95% CI) P value
No. of major events per case + 0.44 (0.12, 1.6) .21 6.2 (2.0, 19) .0020
No. of uncompensated major events per case 13 (2.1, 83) .0060 6.4 (0.99 ,41) .051
No. of minor events per case 1.4 (1.0, 2.0) .030 1.4 (1.2, 1.8) .0010
OR, Odds ratio; CI, confidence intervals.
and analytical methods for the study of complex rela-
tionships between variables that are not traditionally
analyzed together.
Critique of the methodology 
Multicenter study and confidentiality issue. The par-
ticipation of all the surgeons of one country who per-
form a particular operation in such a sensitive study is
a unique feature of this research. It displays openness to
failure, which is most commendable in a climate of
increasing exposure of the medical profession to litiga-
tion and legal proceedings against failure, knowing that
in the United Kingdom there is no law that protects
confidentiality of human factors research. One of the
pitfalls of this multicenter study, however, is that a
number of ASOs were performed simultaneously in
different institutions. This has accounted for a signifi-
cant loss of case reports.
Capturing human factors. Although questionnaires
are routinely used in human factors research, the imple-
mentation of this method in our study was not success-
ful at capturing the wide range of human factors that
could have influenced outcomes. Knowledge of the
outcome of the case when the STAR forms were filled
in may have caused hindsight bias that contributed to
their unreliability. Should similar questionnaires be
used in the future, they should be filled in before the
operations to target features that can potentially influ-
ence outcomes.
The case study reports, which were written on-line
without knowledge of the outcome by human factors
experts who attended the operations, were the most
valuable source of human factors data. The training of
these researchers and the assessment of their abilities
remain an issue to be addressed for future research. The
principal human factors researcher had been in post for
6 months before the start of the data collection. This
was not possible to achieve with the other 2
researchers, hence the additional waste of data.
Video camera recordings could be a useful adjunct to
the observers’ reports. Videotaped records of medical
treatments were shown to capture performance defi-
ciencies that were not revealed by retrospective self
reports.7
We believe that human factors should be included in
risk factors analysis and that more research is needed to
detect them, analyze them, and assess their impact on
medical outcomes. To that end, health care organiza-
tions could benefit greatly from the training and
appointment of human factors researchers who have
acquired a specific training in medical fields. 
Defining negative events. In a previous study,8 we
have used the concept of near misses as failure equiva-
lents with the assumption that death and near misses
were the result of the same underlying mechanisms.
Near misses, as defined in the present study, are in real-
ity severe temporary or permanent complications.
Some recent information would suggest that the risk
factors for death and the risk factors for complications
are in fact quite different.9,10 According to these stud-
ies, the risk factors for complications seem to be relat-
ed more to patient variables than to structural hospital
characteristics. The highest quality, lowest risk hospi-
tals do not have a lower incidence of complications but
a higher prevalence of “rescue” from complications. In
other words, it is the failure to rescue that leads to a
negative outcome. This fits with our personal observa-
tion. After a period of retraining after a cluster of oper-
ative deaths,8 one of us (M.dL.) performed 120 consec-
utive neonatal ASOs with 3 deaths (2.5%). Despite the
return of the mortality to low levels, the incidence of
near misses has remained unchanged. The apparent dif-
ference is that near misses are now less likely to lead to
death; in other words, the operating team is better at
handling complications.
Major and minor events. The impact of major and
minor human failures on outcomes over and above the
traditional patient risk factors is the most important find-
ing of this study. Major failures without compensation
are likely to lead to death, but appropriate human defense
mechanisms can prevent catastrophic consequences.
Uncompensated major events have a multiplicative
effect. If each of them is appropriately compensated,
however, death can be avoided whatever the number.
Minor events are different. They are more subtle and
insidious, and many of them are not even noticed by the
operators and the team members. No conscious attempt
to compensate for them is therefore made in many
instances, thus the lack of correlation between compen-
sation and outcomes for minor events. The main feature
of minor events is their multiplicative effect. In isolation
they have little impact, but their multiplication has a
strong relationship to negative outcomes, whereas a sin-
gle uncompensated major event is likely to lead to death. 
Furthermore, after adjustment for the effects of the
total number of major uncompensated events in a case,
there is still a link between minor events and negative
outcomes. 
Major and minor events represent various types of
human errors. Human error has become an important
topic in many areas of applied psychology, particularly
in safety research. It is now widely accepted that error
tolerance, error detection, and error recovery are as
important as error prevention. Error detection is the first
step in error handling. A great number of minor events
were undetected errors; hence very little was done to
enhance error tolerance or error recovery. Compensation
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is a form of error recovery whereby a strategy to remedy
the situation is implemented before negative conse-
quences accrue.11 There are parallels between the com-
pensations of negative events by the operating room
team and error recovery mechanisms that have been
reported in other high technology systems.12 Our obser-
vations suggest, for example, that the surgeon’s diagnos-
tic skill, knowledge of the various surgical strategies to
correct a problem, and communication with the rest of
the team are important prerequisites of compensation.
Uncompensated events correspond to the “failure to
intervene” errors that have been observed in pilots who
do not act promptly to correct their errors.13
The present study demonstrates that patients’ risk
factors and human factors can combine their effects to
lead to a negative outcome. It would be a logical step to
assume that human compensation actually addresses
both mechanisms of failure. In that context, the words
“compensation,” “recovery,” or “rescue” would take on
a wider meaning and include human strategies
deployed to prevent negative outcomes in the presence
of poor patient risk factors and/or human errors.
Future research. This study has concentrated on
human failure at the sharp end of the system. Many
minor and major events, however, have their origins
beyond the scope of the operating room. They arise
from administrative, strategic, and other top-level deci-
sions made by governments, hospital trusts, education-
al bodies, departmental managers, designers, and the
like, which create latent conditions. It is in that context
that adverse surgical events would have some similari-
ties with an organizational accident or a system acci-
dent in which breakdowns arise from the combined
effects of active and latent failures.14 Investing in the
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Appendix A. Patient and procedural factors
Type of clinical data Clinical factor
Patient-specific variables Age at operation, sex, weight, atrial septostomy
Simple TGA, TGA+VSD
Relationship of the great arteries (anteroposterior or side by side)
Positional cardiac anomalies: isomerism, situs inversus, dextrocardia
Coexisting noncardiac anomalies
Coronary arterial pattern (see text)
Procedural variables Anesthetic time (induction of anesthesia and insertion of lines)
Cardiopulmonary bypass time
Aortic crossclamping time
Total circulatory arrest time
Lowest temperature (°C)
Venous cannulation (bicaval or atrial)
Cardioplegia: crystalloid or blood, single or multiple doses
Level of aortic transection (proximal, mid-portion or distal)
Level of pulmonary artery transection (proximal, mid-portion, distal)
Coronary reimplantation into a defect, slit or a trapdoor flap
Coronary reimplantation into the same sinus or 2 facing sinuses
Single or 2-patch technique to reconstruct the neopulmonary artery
Lecompte maneuver
VSD closure (transatrial, transventricular, transpulmonary, transaortic)
Drugs used: aprotinin, dobutamine, dopamine, epinephrine norepinephrine, enoximone, isoproterenol, sodium 
nitroprusside (Nipride), glyceryl trinitrate, phenoxybenzamine
Mechanical assistance (ECMO or ventricular assistance device)
Sternum closed or not
Peritoneal catheter inserted or not
Postoperative variables Postoperative bleeding (>5 mL–1 · kg–1 · h)




Septic complications (wound infection, chest infection, septicemia, or mediastinitis)
Paralyzed diaphragm, recurrent nerve palsy, pneumothorax, pleural effusion
Time of discharge from ICU
Date of discharge from hospital or death
2-D ECHO before discharge
TGA, Transposition of the great arteries; VSD, ventricular septal defect; ECMO, extracorporeal membrane oxygenator; ICU, intensive care unit; 2-D ECHO, 2-
dimensional echocardiography.
understanding of the latent failures that underlie the
active failures (major and minor negative events) is
probably the most cost-efficient way, long term, to
improve safety in health care.
Conclusion
This study highlights the role of human factors on
surgical outcomes. It supports the suggestion that
human factors should be incorporated in risk factor
analysis. It also emphasizes the need for more research
in human factors in health care organizations.
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Discussion
Dr John J. Lamberti (San Diego, Calif). I would like to
compliment the authors on their attempt to analyze human
factors that may affect outcomes in cardiac surgery. Although
all of us are aware of extraneous factors that may influence
both the short- and long-term results in cardiac surgery, few
surgeons have attempted to analyze a group of patients in the
fashion presented by Dr de Leval and colleagues. Dr de Leval
has been interested in this area for a long time, and his previ-
ous reports demonstrate his willingness to ask difficult ques-
tions in the search for optimal outcomes. 
The concept of risk management in complex organizations
is widely known in industry and the military. The organiza-
tion and management of a nuclear power plant or an aircraft
carrier requires the complex interaction of many individuals
in the performance of precise tasks. One of the limitations of
this report is clearly described in the discussion of the paper.
The attempt to examine human factors was compromised by
the use of a postoperative questionnaire. This type of inquiry
permits hindsight bias as described by the authors. 
The concept of constant, on-line grading of events is best
demonstrated by the evaluation protocols used in the United
States Navy during carrier landings. Every landing is graded
by the landing signals officer. A videotape is made of every
landing. If a pilot disputes his grade, the videotape can be
used as a part of the review—instant replay. A pilot who is
consistently scoring lower than a B grade or its equivalent
may be grounded, and if his scores do not improve with
retraining, he may be asked to leave the air corps. Thus a pilot
may be dropped from the air wing of a carrier despite the fact
that he has always landed on the carrier and never damaged
his plane. 
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Appendix B. The STAR questionnaire
Category of factors Individual STAR factors
Organizational factors Personnel availability
Equipment availability
Bed space in ICU
Scheduling of the operation
Substitutions of rostered personnel
Situational factors Free to concentrate/distractions and 
interruptions
Physical conditions in the theater
“Atmosphere” in the theater
Equipment design or reliability
Monitoring of displays or equipment
Team factors Preoperative team briefings
Confidence in other team members
Team’s ability to deal with unexpected 
events
Communication between theater teams
Harmony/clashes between teams
Personal factors Mental readiness/preparedness




ICU, Intensive care unit.
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Appendix C. Major and minor events
Stage (No.) Description and examples
Major events
Preoperative (4) Serious errors and problems that are experienced before anesthetic induction for surgery, eg, cardiac perforation 
during BAS
Anesthesia (8) Errors and problems experienced during anesthesia and insertion of lines
• Failure to gain sufficient vascular access
• Pincushioning during insertion of lines, leading to a serious cardiac event
• Delayed diagnosis of a major deterioration in the patient’s condition
• Lack of monitoring delaying diagnosis of a serious event
Prebypass (27) • Hemodynamic instability of the patient due to rough surgical manipulations
• Surgical errors, eg, laceration of the ductus arteriosus before bypass
• Serious cannulation problems
• Severe unrecognized deterioration in the patient’s condition (low ABP and SaO2) before bypass caused by cognitive 
tunnel vision on surgical tasks and/or lack of monitoring
• Delay in the administration of heparin
Bypass (44) • Decision-making errors in deciding how to reimplant a difficult CAP (inexperienced surgeons)
• Technical errors: aortic tear during the administration of cardioplegic solution, accidental injury to a major 
coronary artery, malrotation of the main pulmonary artery, twisting the pulmonary artery during the Lecompte 
maneuver, damage to the neoaortic valve, tear during the closure of the ductus arteriosus, severe laceration of a 
pulmonary arterial branch requiring patch repair
• Major perfusion problems
• Anesthetic problems: failure to cool the cardioplegic solution, failure to flush the cardioplegia-infusion set resulting 
in massive coronary air embolism
Postbypass (84) •Serious ischemic event: delay in diagnosis, incorrect interpretation, inappropriate strategy in the event of a serious 
ischemic event
• Ventilation errors by consultant anesthetist
• Surgical omissions; omission of pacing wires in a patient who has severe arrhythmias, omission of securing 
indwelling catheters such as the left atrial line
• Delayed diagnosis; incorrect interpretation of a serious deterioration of the patient during transfer from the operating 
theater to the ICU
Minor events
Preoperative (17) • Coordination problems with the blood bank, problems with the availability of ICU beds
• Communication problems between the ward and the theater team, scheduling of cases
• Poor fasting policy
Anesthesia (67) • Cognitive tunnel vision on insertion of lines to the neglect of monitoring the ECG screen (where no major event 
results)
• Inappropriate delegation of anesthetic tasks to an inexperienced junior
• Equipment problems: failed alarm systems, incorrect ECG readings, or unavailability of equipment
• Human resource problems, eg, no junior anesthetic assistant available, no technical assistance
Prebypass (144) • Positioning and tension error(s) by the surgical assistants
and bypass (732) • Instrument handing errors by the scrub nurse
• Distracters: internal and external
• Inappropriate task delegation (surgical, anesthetic, perfusion) to an inexperienced assistant
• Problems with theater equipment
• Communication errors: problems with passing information between theater teams
• Absence of a senior team member in theater at safety critical times
• Surgical tunnel vision, where the surgeon(s) focuses exclusively on the surgical aspects of the procedure at the 
expense of monitoring the ECG screen (but no serious problems develop); this usually occurs when closing the sternum
• Perfusion problems: air locks, poor visibility because of unsatisfactory blood aspiration
Postbypass (73) • Positioning, tension and instrument handing errors, communication errors, surgical tunnel vision, and equipment 
problems
• Anesthetic problems: eg, adjustment of ventilating parameters, not starting inotropic support and vasodilators at an 
appropriate time
• Communication problems during hand-over to ICU
• Lack of seniority during transfer or in the team admitting the patient to ICU
• Absence of monitoring for an excessive period of time during transfer to the ICU
BAS, Balloon atrial septostomy; ABP, arterial blood pressure; SaO2, arterial oxygen saturation; CAP, coronary artery pattern; ICU, intensive care unit; ECG, electro-
cardiograph.
In contrast, cardiac surgeons do not have a systematic pro-
tocol for examining successful outcomes. If we are pursuing
perfection, then we ought to review each case, both early after
the operation and later in follow-up, to determine which
aspects of the management could be improved. 
The concept of compensation for a negative event is well
defined by Dr de Leval. In both commercial and military avi-
ation, simulators exist for testing the response of a pilot to
varying conditions. To my knowledge, there is no formal
attempt at this kind of training in cardiac surgery. Landing a
plane on a carrier or performing the arterial switch procedure
requires a complex interaction between technology, knowl-
edge, and eye-hand coordination. The price of a mistake in
either area can be high. 
I have several questions for the authors.
There were 243 ASOs, but human factors research was
undertaken in only 173. Do you think that the failure to
include 30% of the outcomes in the human factors analysis
affects the data? 
Second, are you planning to repeat the study or expand the
study with a preoperative questionnaire and a refined
approach to human factors analysis? 
Third, would the inclusion of long-term data add to the
weight of the conclusion since technical problems occurring
during the surgical procedure might lead to a high incidence
of late pulmonary stenosis or left ventricular dysfunction in
survivors? 
Finally, experienced heart surgeons are inclined to state
that any CAP can be switched. Your data suggest that less
commonly occurring CAPs are associated with higher risk.
Should all low-volume centers be required to clearly define
the CAP before performing surgery? If a low-volume center
cannot clearly define the CAP as type I or II, should the
patient then be referred to a higher-volume center? 
Dr de Leval. Thank you, Dr Lamberti. Major and minor
events were extracted from only 173 reports because of the
learning period required for the human factors researchers to
become familiar with the operation. In addition, 1 of the
researchers never reached a sufficient level of understanding
of the procedure and his reports were discarded.
The answer to the second question is, yes. Human factors
questionnaires should be filled in before or during the proce-
dure, but not afterward, to prevent hindsight bias.
The third question relates to long-term data. We are in the
process of analyzing the 6-month results.
With regard to the last question, I believe that the ASO
should be performed only in institutions capable of dealing
with all variants of CAPs.
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